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ABSTRACT. After the fierce polemic (1720-1740) between Joachim Lange and 
his Pietist companions from Halle, on one hand, and Christian Wolff as 
representative of the Enlightenment, on the other hand, the two sides have 
reached a common denominator: the refutation of the philosophy of Benedict 
Spinoza as “acosmism”/Pantheism with fatalist consequences. Spinoza and the 
Spinozism became the common enemy of both, Pietism and Enlightenment. 
Against such an interpretation, the German radical Pietist Gottfried Arnold 
proposes in the second volume of his work Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-
historie (1700/1741) another, very original Spinoza’s reading. The Dutch 
philosopher thinks and actually lives as an authentic Pietist. He affirms and 
practices the unity between thinking and life and proposes a kind of metaphysics 
of the unity between God and nature, which should not be understood as 
pantheism, but as sophiology: all the things are included in God because their 
concepts are thought by the “Eternal Wisdom of God”. 
Keywords: Spinoza, Pietism, Sophiology, acosmism, Pantheism, fatalism, 
philosophy as way of life 
1. Spinozism as Pantheist Metaphysics. Spinoza’s Refutation by the
Halle Pietism and Christian Wolff (1737/1744) 
The German version of Spinoza’s Ethics was printed in 1744. It was the 
second translation of this treatise into a modern language after the Dutch edition 
of 1677, that was published the same year with his entire Latin Opera posthuma, 
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previously published in Amsterdam by Jarrig Jelles and Johann Rieuwertsz. On the 
title page of the German edition, it was written: B. v. S. Sittenlehre widerlegt von 
dem berühmten Weltweisen unserer Zeit Herrn Christian Wolff. Aus dem Lateinischen 
übersetzt. Frankfurt und Leipzig 1744. The identity of the author was hidden 
behind three initials (“B. v. S.”). That had to do with the fact that shortly before the 
end of his treatise the Dutch philosopher himself expressed the wish, that his name 
not be mentioned on the title page, as shown in the Opera posthuma reprinted 
preface of Jarrig Jelles1. On the contrary, the German publisher stressed the name 
of “the famous philosopher of our time, Mr. Christian Wolff”, the author of the 
128-page of a Spinoza’s refutation placed at the end of the book with the title 
Herrn Christian Wolfs Widerlegung der Sittenlehre B. v. S. aus dem andern Theile 
seiner natürlichen Gottesgelahrtheit genommen. 
Trying to explain this oddness, the German translator of Spinoza’s work, 
Johann Lorenz Schmidt, a disciple Christian Wolff’s2, affirms in a short but very 
polemical preface that the intention of his translation as well as of the adding of a 
Widerlegung to this treatise was to defend the being and the freedom God’s (“das 
Daseyn Gottes und die Freyheit desselben”)3 against the Dutch philosopher, who 
is described as “dangerous enemy“ (“gefährlicher Feind“), “the most terrible of all 
enemies of this genus“ (“der erschrecklichsten unter allen [Feinden] von dieser 
Gattung”)4, “fearful enemy” (“fürchterlicher Feind“), “defeated enemy“ (“überwundener 
Feind“), “spook“ (“Gespenst“)5,“god denier“ (“Gottesleugner“)6, etc.  
1 [Jarrig Jelles], “Vorrede vor des Verfassers nachgelassenen Werken. Geneigter Leser”, in B. v. S. 
Sittenlehre widerlegt von dem berühmten Weltweisen unserer Zeit Herrn Christian Wolff, aus dem 
Lateinischen übersetzt, (Frankfurt und Leipzig, 1744), 7-56, here: p. 14. 
2 The name of Johann Lorenz Schmidt was already linked to Wolff’s rationalism because of the 
controversial edition of the «Wertheim Bible» (1735). See J. Thomas Cook, Spinoza’s Ethics. A 
Reader’s Guide (London and New York: Continuum, 2007), 156: “In the midst of the controversy 
surrounding Wolff's exile, a translation of the first five books of the Bible was published (1735) – 
a work that came to be known as the «Wertheim Bible». The translator was a young man named 
Johann Lorenz Schmidt, and his translation was carefully crafted to remove all mention of the 
supernatural or miraculous from the text, as well as all mention of the ostensible Old Testament 
foretelling of the coming of Jesus. Wolff had been supportive of Schmidt, personally and 
professionally, and so suspicion was rife that the Werheim Bible was a natural result of the 
Wolffian philosophy”. 
3[Johann Lorenz Schmidt], “Vorrede zu dieser Übersetzung”, in B. v. S. Sittenlehre..., 3-6, here: p. 5. 
4 Ibid, 4. 
5 Ibid, 5. 
6 Ibid, 6. 
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Schmidt seems to actually be concerned rather to defend his mentor 
Christian Wolff against the allegation of his «cruel opponents» (“grausame 
Widersacher”) that he would be a follower of Spinoza7.  
Johann Lorenz Schmidt does not name these «cruel opponents», but they 
were well known at the middle of the eighteenth century. In the year 20s of the 
eighteenth century a fierce polemic between Pietistic members of the Halle 
Theological Faculty, led by Joachim Lange, and Christian Wolff broke at the 
University of Halle. The controversy arose from the publication by the German 
philosopher of two works, Ratio praelectionum Wolffianarum in Mathesin et 
Philosophiam universam (1718) and Vernünftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und 
der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt, den liebhabern der Wahrheit 
mitgeteilt (1720) and was focused on the alleged Spinozistic nature of the 
Wolffian philosophy8. Lange and his Pietistic companions suspected Wolff to be a 
rationalist and determinist. “Rationalism and determinism were thought to imply 
that all things were necessary, i.e., fatalism, which was commonly equated with 
Spinozism”9. This way, Joachim Lange, the main Wolff’s opponent in Halle, 
claimed the mechanical vision of his metaphysics. “He set one of Wolff’s big errors 
in his mechanization of the world and the reduction of humans to automata. (…) 
Lange said Wolff had committed the particular error of Spinoza, by believing «in 
absolutely mechanical fate»”10. Like Spinoza, he conceives the world as clockwork, 
«a spiritual automaton». That means mechanical necessity and, from an ethical 
point of view, fatalism11. 
7 Ibid, 4-5: “Die Ehre einer ordentlichen und gründlichen Widerlegung war unserm großen deutschen 
Weltweisen, dem Herrn geheimen Rathe Wolf, vorbehalten. Seine grausamen Widersacher gaben 
ihm die Veranlassung dazu. Sie wußten in ihrem Grimme nichts Heftigeres gegen ihn zu erdenken, als 
daß sie ihn zu Spinozas Partey zähleten, und vorgaben, er wollte mit demselben das verworfene 
blinde Schicksal nebst der Nothwendigkeit aller Dinge wieder hervorziehen. Aller Sfutzschriften 
ungeachtet, verharreten sie so hartnäckig bey dieser Beschuldigung, daß sie sich dieselbe nict 
wollten ausreden lassen. Allein, wie sehr wurden sie beschähmet, als sie endlich aus dessen 
größeren Werken ersahen, daß er seinen Feind ohne Verstellung angriff, und denselben mit 
unumstößlichen Gründen von dem angemaßten Throne der Wahrheit herabstützte. Wie herrlich 
war nicht dieser Sieg der Wahrheit!“ 
8 J. Thomas Cook, Spinoza’s Ethics. A Reader’s Guide, 156. In this way the Pietistic “accusations 
against Wolff called attention to the positions of Spinoza and led to a more serious study of the 
texts” of the Dutch philosopher. 
9 J.C. Morisson, “Christian Wolff’s Criticisms of Spinoza,” Journal of History of Philosophy, 31 (1993): 
405-420; reprinted in Spinoza. Critical Assessments, ed. Genevieve Lloyd, vol. IV: The Reception 
and Influence of Spinoza’s Philosophy (London-New York: Routledge, 2001), 122-137, here: p. 
122. 
10 William Clark, “The Death of Metaphysics in Enlightened Prussia”, in The Sciences in Enlightened 
Europe, by William Clark, Jan Golinski and Simon Schaffer (Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1999), 423-426; here: p. 427. 
11 Ibid., 428. 
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Facing such accusations, Christian Wolff tried to defend himself and 
began to publish criticisms of Spinoza’s philosophy, culminating in a systematic 
refutation of Spinoza’s Ethics. “His basic strategy was to confirm the widely held 
view that Spinoza was a universal fatalist and to prove that he himself was not by 
showing that his own philosophical principles provided the basis for a decisive 
refutation of Spinoza’s principles. More precisely, his strategy was to prove that 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason does not have the harmful consequences alleged 
by the Pietist critics by showing that it could be used to refute the very doctrines, 
especially fatalism, from which these consequences followed”12. 
In the first phase of the controversy Wolff’s attempts failed. The Pietistic 
«cruel opponents» in Halle urged the king Frederick William I to dismiss and 
banish Christian Wolff, who they denounced as an atheist13. In the year 172314 the 
German philosopher had to pass into Saxony, where he had received a call from 
the University of Marburg.  
But Wolff does not give up. During his stay in Marburg he further tried to 
distance himself from Spinoza and to show how different are his philosophy and 
the Pantheistic metaphysics of the Dutch thinker. Therefore, Wolff developed a 
critique of Spinoza that originally formed the section half of his Theologia 
Naturalis (1737). This is actually the text that will be translated in German and 
reprinted alongside the first German edition of Spinoza’s Ethics in 1744, four 
years after Wolff’s return in Halle. It played an important role in the decision from 
1740 to call back the rationalist philosopher at the University of Halle and in his 
reconciliation with the Pietist Joachim Lange the day after returning as professor 
in Halle15.  
Actually Wolff does not refute the philosophy of Spinoza as such, but the 
“Spinozism” (Spinozisterey), i.e. his influence and the movement that the author of 
the Ethics causes or, as Adorno would say, “the jargon of the acosmism (or 
Pantheism)”. Wolff defines Spinozism as “an opinion according to which is 
supposed one unique existing thing, which possesses infinite attributes, of which 
12 Morisson: “Christian Wolff’s Criticisms of Spinoza”, 122-123. 
13 Benjamin Marschke, “From Heretics to Hypocrites. Anti-Pietist Rhetoric in the Eighteenth 
Century”, in Kinship, Community, and Self: Essays in Honor of David Warren Sabean, by Jason Coy et 
al., Spektrum: Publications of German Studies Association, vol. 9 (Berghahn Books, 2015), 122-31; 
p. 122: “Pietism was initially targeted by the establishment; later, it was targeted as the 
establishment”; p. 126: “In this way, the terms of the controversy regarding Pietism had inverted 
– the Pietists had gone from the persecuted to being the persecutors”. 
14 The outbreak of the polemic between Wolff and Lange was occasioned by Wolff’s Oratio de 
Sinarum philosophia practica (1721). In this text, Wolff argued that the Chinese people are the 
role model for the virtuous atheists and a successful state although “they do not know the creator 
of the world”. See Christian Wolff, Oratio de Sinarum philosophia practica [1721]: lat.-dt. Aufl.: 
Rede über die praktische Philosophie der Chinesen, übers., eingel. und hg. von M. Albrecht, 
Philosophische Bibliothek, Bd. 374 (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1985), 27. 
15 Clark, “The Death of Metaphysics in Enlightened Prussia”, 426, 436-37; 458-60. 





two are infinite thought and infinite extension and which express each an eternal 
and infinite essence: finite things emerge out the necessary diversification of the 
modes in the attributes of this existing thing”16.  
So described, the Spinozisterey presents itself as a reduction of the Spinoza’s 
philosophy to a few aspects of his metaphysics, of which the most important is 
the acosmism17. “Since acosmism becomes the primary topos for Spinozism, it 
becomes clear how the metaphysical component of the Ethics remained primary 
in understanding it”18.  
Wolff does not criticize this reduction. On the contrary, he takes it as such 
and operates in its framework. In uncritical agreement with the criticized 
Spinozism he focuses his lecture of Spinoza on the posthumously published Ethics 
(1677) and particularly on its metaphysical part. Both the Spinozisterey, and the 
Spinoza’s Widerlegung (1737/1744) by Christian Wolff contributed significantly 
to the understanding of the Dutch philosopher as a metaphysician19. The immediate 
consequence of this attempt was that “the ethical concerns of Spinozism fall out as 
secondary constructions without a solid foundation”20. Not so much the Wolff’s 
critique on the Spinozisterey21 but the establishment of this reduction of Spinozism 
to the metaphysical dimension of Spinoza’s thinking and the ranking of the ethical 
reflection of the Dutch philosopher after his metaphysics and in dependence on this 
found a strong echo in the later European philosophical consciousness. 
                                                             
16Herrn Christian Wolfs Widerlegung der Sittenlehre B. v. S. aus dem andern Theile seiner natürlichen 
Gottesgelahrtheit genommen [1744], § 671, pp. 3-4: “Die Spinozisterey ist eine meinung, nach 
welcher nicht mehr, als ein einziges bestehndes Ding, welches unendliche Eigenschaften besitzet, 
angenommen wird, wovon ihrer zwo das unendliche Denken und die unendliche Ausdehnung sind, 
und deren jede ein ewiges und unendliches Wesen ausdrücket: die endlichen Dinge aber entstehen 
nach derselben aus der nothwendigen Abwechselung der Weisen in den Eigenschaften dieses 
bestehenden Dinges; zum Beyspiele die Seelen, aus Abwechselung der Weisen in dem unendlichen 
Denken, und die Körper, aus Abwechselung der Weisen in der unendlichen Ausdehnung.” 
17 Regarding the history of this term, see Cook, Spinoza’s Ethics, 154-55: “A few freethinkers in Great 
Britain, usually identified as deists, seem to have been influenced by the doctrines of the Ethics. 
One of these, John Toland, coined the term «Pantheism» (in 1705) to refer to a doctrine, like that 
espoused in the Ethics, that identifies God with all nature. The term became a shorthand way of 
referring to Spinoza’s metaphysical views, though like «Spinozism» it was a term of dismissal and 
in common mind, hardly distinguishable from atheism”. 
18 Ashley Underwood Vaught, The Specter of Spinoza in Schelling’s «Freiheitsschrift». A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the department of Philosophy, Villanova University, UMI 2008, 67. 
19Ibid, 68: “Perhaps this is why Spinoza was so universally understood as a metaphysician”. See 
also: Günter Gawlick, “Einige Bemerkungen über Christian Wolffs Verhältnis zu Spinoza”, in Spinoza 
im Deutschland des actzehnten Jahrhunderts. Zur Erinnerung an Hans-Christian Lucas, by Eva 
Schürmann, Norbert Waszek and Frank Weinreich (Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt, 2002), 110. 
20 Underwood Vaught, The Specter of Spinoza…, 67. 
21Ibid, 72: “Despite the fact it was published with the first translation and that intellectual figures 
such as Lessing, Mendelssohn and Goethe would read this edition of Spinoza’s work, there is little 






This was also the meeting point between Pietism and Enlightenment, the 
two different and often antagonistic main spiritual movements of the eighteenth 
century. The Pietistic opponents of Christian Wolff and Johann Lorenz Schmidt 
felt vindicated because of the annex with the Wolff’s Widerlegung, which the 
German edition of the Spinoza’s Ethics contained, although critics suspected that 
the introduction of the refutation was “just a smokescreen in order to get the 
Ethics published”22. 
Anyway, after a long and fierce polemic with the Halle Pietists the 
representatives of the Enlightenment learned to develop a new kind of discourse, 
that avoids the confrontation with these «cruel opponents» and looks for a common 
denominator even in the refutation of Spinoza’s pantheistic metaphysics. Pietism and 
Enlightenment meet each other in the common suspicion against the Spinozisterey 
and in a common understanding of the Spinoza’s philosophy.  
 
 
2. Philosophy as a Way of Life. Gottfried Arnold and Spinoza’s 
Pietistic Agreement Between Life and Philosophy  
A few years before the publishing of the Sittenlehre (1744) was printed 
the third edition of a famous Pietistic theological work, the Unpartheyische Kirchen- 
und Ketzer-historie vom Anfang des Neuen Testaments biß auf das Jahr Christi 1688 
by the radical Pietist Gottfried Arnold. The first edition of this work was published 
in Frankfurt am Main in the years 1698-1700. This edition was significantly 
supplemented in 1703 with “Supplementa, Illustrationes und Emendationes zur 
Verbesserung der Kirchen=historie”, that will be included in the second edition 
(Frankfurt, 1729) as an annex alongside the main text of the treatise. A much better 
edition, the third, appeared in 1740 [vol. II, 1741; vol. III, 1742] in Schaffhausen23. 
It is due to Johann Friedrich Cotta (1701-1779), Professor at the University of 
Tübingen, who became later the head of the «Confessionals», which was opposite 
to the Pietists and therefore to Arnold himself. Especially the second (and the 
third) volume of this edition bears the mark of Johann Friedrich Cotta24.  
                                                             
22 Cook, Spinoza’s Ethics, 156. 
23 Franz Dibelius, Gottfried Arnold. Sein Leben und seine Bedeutung für die Kirche und Theologie. 
Eine kirchenhistorische Monographie (Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz, 1873), 240-41. 
24 Dibelius cites the results of the investigations of Christian Sepp, Geschiedkundige Nasporingen 
(Leyden: De Breuk & Smits, 1872-75), apud Dibelius, Gottfried Arnold, 241: “Der Herausgeber 
des ersten Bandes ist nach dem Zeugnis Edelmann’s einer seiner pietistischen Freunde, dessen 
unwesentliche Zusätze übrigens meist aus Salig’s Historie der Ausburger Confession entnommen 
sind. Als Herausgeber der beiden folgenden Bände erscheint der Tübinger Professor Cotta, der 
späterhin als Haupt im Lager der Confessionellen gewiß nicht zu Arnold’s Freunden zählt und 
schon deßhalb seine ‘Jugendsünde’ geheim hielt, ganz abgesehen von dem würtembergischen 
Edikt des Jahres 1703, das allem Lesen und verbreiten der Werke Arnold’s zu steuern suchte. 
Seine Bearbeitung ist viel viel umfangreicher und bedeutender als die des ersten Bandes; die 
Schaffhauser Ausgabe verdankt also ihm den Ruhm, die beste zu sein”. 





In this second volume (1741) Gottfried Arnold devotes several pages 
from the chapter 16 to the “atheists”, “naturalists”, “deists” and “latitudinarians”, 
among which Benedict Spinoza occupies an important place25.In contrast to 
Spinoza’s reading in the circles of the Halle Pietism and Enlightenment in the first 
half of the eighteenth century (especially between 1720-1750), which was 
focused on the refutation of his metaphysical ideas as they are articulated 
particularly in the Ethics (1677), Gottfried Arnold offers here another, completely 
different perspective on the life and the thinking of the Dutch thinker. He 
addresses this topic based first on the Teological-Political Treatise (1670) and not 
on the Ethics (1677) that however he does not ignore. He mentions the Ethics 
among the works of Spinoza26 and cites it twice27, respectively the propositions 
11 from the part I and 4 from the part IV. 
That could have to do with the fact that “in the early eighteenth century 
the Theological-Political Treatise continued to be much better known than the 
Ethics. The Treatise had been translated into Dutch, French and English, and had 
provoked innumerable refutations from all over. The Ethics, by contrast, existed 
only in Latin and Dutch, and though the original Opera Posthuma could be found 
in libraries in all parts of Europe, most people with knowledge of the content of 
Ethics had garnered that knowledge from secondary sources, especially Bayle’s 
Dictionnaire”.28 
But actually Gottfried Arnold, like many other interpreters until today29, 
appreciates in special way Spinoza’s exemplary unity of thought and life. Spinoza 
places the concept of the philosophical way of life, like the Stoics and the Epicureans 
in antiquity, in the middle of his philosophical considerations30. Michael Czelinski-
Uesbeck31 showed how exemplary are the input words of Spinoza’s treatise On the 
Improvement of the Understanding (Tractatus de intellectus emendatione) for the 
putting of his whole thought into the service of a good life: “After experience had 
taught me all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that 
                                                             
25 Gottfried Arnold, Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-historie vom Anfang des Neuen Testaments 
biß auf das Jahr Christi 1688. [1699-1700], bey dieser neuen Auflage an vielen Orten verbessert, 
und in bequemere Ordnung bgebracht, wie auch mit verschiedenen nützlichen Anmerckungen 
und einem weitläuffigem Anhang vermehert, Schaffhausen, 1741, Bd. II, 16. Kap. “Von deen 
Atheisten, wie auch denen so genannten Naturalisten, Deisten und Latitudinariis in diesem 
saeculo”, 209-22; about Spinoza: § 37-§ 45, pp. 219-22. 
26 Ibid, §37, p. 219. 
27 Ibid, §39, p. 220. 
28 Cook, Spinoza’s Ethics, 154. 
29 Helmut Seidel, Spinoza zur Einführung (Hamburg, 1994), 17: “Seit Sokrates und einigen seiner 
Schüler (Kyniker) ist die Übereinstimmung von philosophischer Denkweise und existentieller 
Lebensform nirgends so überzeugend demonstriert worden wie von Spinoza”. 
30 Michael Czelinski-Uesbeck, Der Tugendhafte Atheist. Studien zur Vorgeschichte der Spinoza-







none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or 
bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire 
whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, 
which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else; whether, in fact, 
there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me 
to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness”32. Philosophy is for 
Spinoza, above all, ethics, practical philosophy33. In a paradoxical way, this unity 
of thought and life, respectively this practical character of the philosophy is less 
stressed in Spinoza’s work entitled Ethics than in his other treatises (especially in 
Tractatus teologico-politicus, in Tractatus de intellectus emendation, and in his 
Epistles).  
This is the reason because Gottfried Arnold gives more attention to these 
works of the Dutch philosopher, especially to the Theological-Political Treatise 
and to the Epistles, than to Spinoza’s Ethics. After he mentions all the works of 
Spinoza in § 37, the radical Pietist cites on this line the Theological-Political 
Treatise 13 times (3x the Preface; 2x Chapter I – p. 7; 2x Chapter IV – pp. 46, 47, 1x 
Chapter V – p. 65; 1x Chapter VII – p. 85; 2x Chapter XI – pp. 139, 143; 2x Chapter 
XV – p. 170 and fine), the Epistles 8 times (Ep. II; Ep. XIX, 2x Ep. XXI. ad 
Oldenburgium; Ep. XXIII, Ep. XXIV, Ep. XLIX, Ep. LXXIV) and the Ethics only twice 
(part I, propos. 11 and part IV, propos. 4 – p. 169). Arnold pays the same attention 
to Spinoza’s Ethics as to the Preface of Jarrig Jelles to the Opera posthuma (1677) 
that he cites also twice34. He uses the Ethics only to show that Spinoza is not an 
Atheist35. Although the author of the Ethics was accused of being an atheist, 
nobody could prove these allegations. On the contrary Spinoza founded all his 
principles on the idea of God’s existence and rejected the atheism as a horrendum 
facinus36. On this line Arnold quotes the following text from the demonstration of 
                                                             
32 Benedict de Spinoza, “On the Improvement of the Understanding [Tractatus de intellectus 
emendatione]”, in On the Improvement of the Understanding, Ethics and Correspondence, by 
Benedict de Spinoze, trans. R.H.M. Elwes (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2006), 1-38, here: p. 1. 
33 Czelinski-Uesbeck: Der Tugendhafte Atheist, 13-14. 
34 Arnold, Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-historie, §37, footnote i), 220; §44, footnote l), 222. 
35 Ibid, §38, 220: “Man hätte von ihm ausgesprengt/ als wolte er ein buch schreiben/ darinne 
bewiesen würde/ es sey kein Gott/ und deßwegen hätten ihn auch etliche Theologi, welche diß 
geschrey wol selbsten erst erdacht gehabt/ bey der hohen obrigkeit angegeben. (...) Nach seinem 
tode aber ist er durchgehends als ein formaler Atheiste beschrieben und angegeben worden, wie 
mehr als zu bekannt ist. Nun kan eben niemand einige ausdrückliche worte in seinen schrifften, 
darinnen er Gottes existentz geleugnet hätte, wie die scribenten die seiner sonst nicht schonen 
freywillig bekennen”. 
36 Ibid, §38, p. 220: Vielmehr hat er selbst seine principia auf die existentz Gottes und dessen 
vornehmste eigenschafften nach der natürlichen erkänntniß gegründet, wie es seine schrifften 
deutlich ausweisen, und der auctor der praefation über seine opera posthuma nennet den 
atheismus einen horrendum facinus, das keinem weisen mann anstehe, noch bey ihm gefunden 
werden könne.” See Czelinski-Uesbeck: Der Tugendhafte Atheist, 26-27. 





the proposition 4 from the part IV of the Ethics37: “The power, whereby each 
particular thing, and consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God 
or of Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.); not in so far as it is infinite, but in so far as it can be 
explained by the actual human essence (III. Vii).  
Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained through his own actual 
essence, is a part of the infinite power of God or Nature, in other words, of the 
essence thereof (I. xxxiv)”38. Arnold insists: the Dutch thinker described God in 
part I, proposition 11 of the Ethics as a “substance, consisting of infinite attributes, 
of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality”39.  
But these two quotations from the Ethics remain isolated in the economy 
of his reasoning. The main arguments of Gottfried Arnold against Spinoza’s 
atheism incrimination have other sources, especially the Theological-Political 
Treatise40 and the Correspondence. In the Letter XXI [LXXIII] to Oldenburg41, the 
German radical Pietist believes he found a proof of Spinoza’s adherence to 
Christianity. Actually Arnold claimed from the beginning of his short text about 
the life and the doctrine of the Dutch thinker, that Spinoza was baptized42.  
                                                             
37 Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics, in On the Improvement of the Understanding. The Ethics. 
Correspondence, by Benedict de Spinoza, trans. from the Latin, with an Introduction by R.H. 
Elwes (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955), part IV, propos. 4, p. 193: “It is impossible, that 
man should not be a part of Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes, save 
such as can be understood through his nature only as their adequate cause.” 
38 Ibid. See Arnold, Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-historie, §39, p. 220: “Die potentia oder kraft, 
wodurch die eintzelen creaturen/ und also auch der mensch/ ihr wesen erhalten/ ist selbst die 
kraft Gottes oder der natur; nicht zwar so fern diese unendlich ist/ sondern so fern sie durch die 
würckliche essentz des menschen kan expliciret werden/ deßwegen die kraft des menschen/ so 
fern sie durch sein würckliches wesen ausgedrucket wird/ ein theil der unendlichen krafft Gottes 
oder der natur/ das ist/ des wesens ist“. 
39 Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics, part I, propos. 11, p. 51. Arnold, Unpartheyische Kirchen- und 
Ketzer-historie, §39, p. 220: “Wie er denn auch Gott beschreibet als eine substantz/ die aus 
unendlichen attributis bestehe/ deren ein jedwedes das ewige und unendliche wesen ausdrucke.” 
40 Arnold, Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-historie, §40, p. 220: Tractat. Theologico-Polit. C.IV., 
46-47. 
41 “Letter XXI [LXXIII] to H. Oldenburg”, in The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, vol. II, trans. from 
the Latin by R.H.M. Elwes (London: G. Bell, 1884), 298-299, here: p. 298: “I say that all things are 
in God and move, thus agreeing with Paul, and perhaps with all the ancient philosophers of 
antiquity, though the phraseology may be different”. See Arnold: Unpartheyische Kirchen- und 
Ketzer-historie, §40, p. 220: “Ich sage mit Paulo/ daß alles in Gott sey/ und in Gott beweget werde 
(Act. 17,28) und vielleicht auch mit allen Philosophis, obgleich auf eine andere weise.” 
42 Ibid, §37, p. 219: “Denn er [Benedictus Spinosa] war ein gebohrner Jude, und hatte in seiner 
jugend aus natürlicher begierde etwas zu wissen, sich gar sehr in den büchern umgesehen, auch 
seinen Rabbinen so viel händel gemacht daß sie ihn von sich angestossen hatten. Hierauf gab er 
sich bey den Christen an, und weil denen, welche ihn aufnahmen, der geist der prüffung mangeln 






At the beginning of the 18th century this issue was highly controversial43. 
Spinoza himself speaks depending on the audience in different ways44. Arnold 
does not overlook this problem, but he is concerned to emphasize rather the 
Pietistic way of life of Spinoza than his adherence to Christianity. This is because 
the formal adherence to the Church has no importance for Gottfried Arnold as 
Pietistic Theologian.  
Pietism was a spiritual movement which has appeared as reaction to the 
reduction of the Christianity to a few dogmatic or metaphysical contents without 
regard for life45. The first signs of this movement appeared at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century in Britain, and later in the Low Countries and Germany. Named 
“Puritanism”46 in the English speaking countries or “Pietism” in the rest of 
                                                             
43 See Czelinski-Uesbeck, Der Tugendhafte Atheist, 26-27; 74-75: Chr. Kortholt Sr. [De tribus 
impostoribus magnus liber, Kiloni, 1680, p. 75] affirms already in 1680 that Spinoza became a 
Christian after his excommunication from the Jewish community. According to Friedrich Kettner 
[De Duobus Impostoribus, benedicto Spinosa et Balthasare Bekkero, Dissertatio Historica, Lipsiae, 
1694, p. 4], Spinoza’s conversion to Christianity would have followed after his flagellation in the 
Jewish Synagogue from Amsterdam. Der Criticus [Der gelehrte Criticus über curieuse Dubia und Fragen 
aus der Kirchen- und Profan-Historie, wie nicht weniger aus der geographie, Philologie, Moralité und 
Politic. Abgefasset von dem Autore des wohl-informirten Redners, Gleditsch, Leipzig 1704-1706, p. 
1094] takes over this information. Henrich Ludolff Benthem [P.C. und S. Holländischer Kirch- und 
Schulen-Staat, Hannover 1698, 350ff.] affirms too that Spinoza was a disreputable contemporary 
although he became Christian. Gottfried Arnold [Unpartheyischen kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie, 1700] 
does nothing more than to continue this direction. In 1706 Seckendorff still supports that it is 
obviously that a Jew or a Portuguese in Netherland, who is called B. Spinoza, became Christian. On the 
contrary Johann Christoph Sturm und Christoph Sand jun., who knew Spinoza personally, and 
Johannes Colerus in 1705 [first engl. edition: John Colerus, minister of the Lutheran Church at the 
Hague: The Life of Benedict de Spinosa, done out of French, London, 1706] contradict this information. 
According to Johann Wolfgang Jäger [De Bened. Spinozae vita et doctrina, Dissertatio, 1710, p. 32], 
Spinoza “was neither Jew nor Christian”. Sigismund Hosmann [Das schwer zu bekehrende Juden-Hertz. 
Nebst einigen Vorbereitungs-mitteln zu der Juden Bekehrung, Zelle, 1699, p. 166] emphasize that the 
most important atheists and naturalists who fight against the Christian faith are Jews, for example: B. 
Spinoza. In principle, they who doubt Spinoza’s adherence to Christianity are either people who knew 
Spinoza personally or suspicious theologians regarding Spinoza and the Jews. 
44 Ibid, 26. 
45 See Martin H. Jung, Pietismus (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005), 8; Picu 
Ocoleanu: Sophia Parthenos. Etica sofianică a vieţii contemplative în pietismul german şi în sofiologia 
ortodoxă rusă (Craiova: Ed. Mitropolia Olteniei, 2014), 10. 
46 Andrew Cooper Fix, Prophecy and Reason: The Dutch Collegiants in the Early Enlightenment 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 19: “Beginning of the sixteenth century a systematic 
attempt was made on the part of the educated classes of Europe, and in particular the clergy, to 
reform or change the attitudes and values of the rest of the population. Protestant and Catholic 
reformers endeavored to spread their religious ideas and practices among the lower classes, and in 
the process they attempted to suppress many aspects of traditional popular culture. Peter Burke has 
suggested that these religious reformers can be seen as “puritans” because they sought to purify the 
beliefs of the lower classes from popular superstitions and pagan survivals. This clerical campaign 
against popular culture made swiftest progress in urban areas and in Protestant regions of Europe, 
although Catholic areas also affected, if somewhat later.” 





Europe, this movement overcame the confessional boundaries and emphasized 
how important leading a really Christian way of life actually is. This is the reason 
why Gottfried Arnold retains especially Spinoza’s ascetic endeavors47 and his 
inclination to lead a quiet life. Arnold mentions on this line the retreat of Spinoza 
among the Rijnsburg Collegiants, a kind of Dutch Pietists, who lead a quiet 
philosophical life and the rejection of the call at the University of Heidelberg. Both 
of them correspond to the Pietistic ideal of life for which he pleads. In the same 
Pietistic logic, Arnold records with satisfaction the negative reaction of Spinoza to 
the Scholastic and Aristotelian theology which he considers a form of alienation 
and an abuse against the word of God48. According to Spinoza, the consequence of 
this alienation is the rift between discourse and practical life. Thereby Spinoza 
meets again the Pietism in its main theological topic49. 
Arnold concludes regarding the issue of the supposed Spinoza’s atheism: 
Christianity has nothing to do with an intellectual confession of faith, but with a 
way of life (“lebensart”), with a “praxis”50. From this point of view, Gottfried 
Arnold suggests that Spinoza’s life and thinking correspond completely to the 
Pietistic (i.e. authentic Christian) life ideal. 
 
                                                             
47 Arnold, Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-historie, §37, p. 219: “Er soll daselbsten auf seine 
dinge so gar erpicht gewesen seyn, daß er kaum in einem viertaljahr einmal vor die thür heraus 
gekommen”. 
48 Ibid., §40-§41, p. 220: “Wenn wir aber ferner nach seinem begriff von der Christlichen religion 
fragen, so finden wir, daß er sich an scholastischen und Aristotelischen theologie am meisten 
geärgert, und darüber ohne zweiffel auf seine eigene meynungen gerathen sey. 
Er schreibet von denen Theologis unter andern also: “Ich bekenne, daß sie sich über die tieffen 
geheimnisse der schrifft verwundert haben: jedoch sehe ich, daß sie nichts als Aristotelische und 
Platonische speculationes vorgetragen, darauff sie die schrifft appliciret, damit es nicht schiene, 
als folgten sie den Heyden nach. Es ist ihnen nicht gnug gewesen, der Griechen ihrer thorheit zu 
folgen, sondern sie haben auch die Propheten nach derselben accomodiret, woraus man siehet, 
daß sie die göttlichkeit der schrifft niemals recht erkannt, und je mehr sie sich über die 
geheimnisse verwundern, e mehr weisen sie, daß sie nicht so wol der schrifft glauben, als nur 
schmeicheln“. s) Allein über der betrachtung dieses mißbrauchs der heiligen schrifft, ist er 
hingegen auf das andere extremum verfallen“. 
49 Martin Bollacher, Der junge Goethe und Spinoza. Studien zur geschichte des Spinozismus in der 
|Epoche des Sturms und Drangs, Studien zur deutschen Literatur, hg. Richard Brinkmann, 
Friedrich Sengle und Klaus Ziegler, Bd. 18 (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969), 55-56. 
Bollacher highlights the common points between Spinoza and Arnold. The most important 
among these is the necessity of an agreement between the doctrine and the practical life.  
50 Arnold, Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-historie,, §45, p. 222: “Ein verständiger leser wird 
nach untersuchung dieser angeführten historien wohl von selbst ernstlich wünschen, daß 
diejenigen grossen ärgernisse aus der Christenheit abgethan werden möchten, woraus so wohl 
alle ruchlosigkeit als der atheismus selbst bey den leuten entstehet; nemlich die verkehrte lehre 
und praxis bey so vielen, die sich lehrer, und zwar rechtgläubige zu seyn unterwinden, und dann 






3. Spinoza’s Metaphysics as Sophiology. Gottfried Arnold’s 
Interpretation of the alleged Panteism of Benedict Spinoza 
The main suspicion against Spinoza’s thinking regards at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century his “acosmism”, namely the identification between God 
and the nature and its determinist and fatalist consequences in the practical life. 
Joachim Lange and his Pietistic companions in Halle but representatives of the 
Enlightenment like Christian Wolff focused their polemic against Spinoza on his 
pantheist metaphysics too. Their Spinoza’s reading starts at the Ethics and is 
limited to its metaphysical parts.  
On the contrary, Gottfried Arnold proposes a Spinoza’s reading beginning 
at his practical philosophy, namely at the unity between thinking and life that he 
requests above all. Nevertheless, the question concerning the alleged pantheism 
of the Dutch philosopher remains open. Arnold provides an original answer to 
this question which opposes to the Spinoza’s interpretation of the Pietistic 
mainstream.  
Based on the rational method of the mathematics, Spinoza aimed to show 
that God is a single substance and all the things are contained in him. But 
according to the German radical Pietist this does not necessary mean that Spinoza 
is an “acosmist” or a “Pantheist”. Following Jarring Jelles’s ideas from the preface 
to the Ethics printed in Opera posthuma and translated later into the German by 
J.L. Schmidt, Gottfried Arnold argues that Spinoza and the Disciples of Christ, 
Apostle Paul and Apostle John, agree completely in the doctrine about God51. Like 
Jelles, he “juxtaposed Spinoza’s statements with quotations from the Acts (17:28) 
which have it that «in him [God] we live, and move, and have our being»” and 
“emphasized the unselfish love of God and neighbor constituted the ethical ideal 
of both Spinoza and John the Evangelist”52. 
Thus Arnold interprets the Spinoza’s identification between God and the 
nature not in an acosmist/pantheistic sense but as sophiology. Spinoza himself 
confessed to H. Oldenburg that he understands the identification between God 
and the nature in the sense of Apostle Paul (Acts 17,28): “I say that all things are 
                                                             
51 Ibid., §39, p. 220: “Anderswo saget er: Ich halte Gott vor die causam aller dinge/ aber 
immanentem nicht transeuntem. Ich sage mit Paulo/ daß alles in Gott sey/ und in Gott beweget 
werde (Act. 17, 28) und vielleicht auch mit allen Philosophis, obgleich auf eine andere weise.” 
52Honorata Jakuszko, “The Spinoza Inspiration in the Late German Enlightenment (Spätaufklärung)”, 
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 15, 28 (2009): 173-88; here: 175-176. H. Jakuszko cites 
here the following titles: H. Timm, Gott und Freiheit. Studien zur Religionsphilosophie der Goethezeit, 
Die Spinozarenaissance, (Frankfurt am Main), pp. 162-163; on the spiritual affinity between 
Spinoza and Paul the Apostle: J.Ch. Edelmann, “Abgenötigtes jedoch Andern nicht wieder 
aufgenötigtes Glaubens-Bekenntnis”, in Das entdeckte Christentum im Vormärz, by W. Barnikol 
(Jena, 1927), 167-168 (the quoted text was authored in 1745); on the affinity between Spinoza 
and John the Apostle: G. Herder, “Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele (1778)”, 
in Sämtliche Werke, ed. B. Suphan, Bd. VIII (Berlin, 1877), 202.  





in God and move, thus agreeing with Paul, and perhaps with all the ancient 
philosophers of antiquity, though the phraseology may be different”53. That 
means that all the things in nature are actually included in the mind of God as 
divine concepts, ideas and decrees54, respectively that everything in nature brings 
with itself a divine concept (einen begriff von Gott) according to the mode of every 
being and its perfection55. The knowledge of nature leads therefore to the 
knowledge of God. This is the reason why this knowledge of nature is not an 
exterior, a physical knowledge (äusserliche erkänntniß), but a kind of inspiration, 
of contemplation, of God’s revelation in our souls56.  
Arnold’s interpretation of the unity between God and nature in Spinoza’s 
thinking has nothing to do with their Pantheist identification. The nature (or 
rather: the logic of the nature) is contained in God, in the collector of all the divine 
meanings (rationes divinae) that God himself contemplates. This is actually the 
wisdom of God (die weisheit Gottes57), Sophia, about which Spinoza says, it has 
taken in Christ human nature. “The Eternal Son of God, that is the Eternal Wisdom 
of God (…) has manifested itself in all things and especially in the human mind, 
and above all in Christ Jesus” affirms Spinoza in Letter XXI [LXXIII] to H. 
Oldenburg58.  
                                                             
53 See note 41 in this text.  
54 Arnold: Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-historie, §39, p. 220: “In diesem göttlichen wesen, 
sagt er nun, wären die creaturen als göttliche conceptus, ideen und decreta, deren würckung selbst 
das wesen aller dinge mit seye, die in Gott enthalten wären, und was er mehr vor solgereyen aus 
dieser meynung ziehet.” 
55 Arnold quotes here a text from the Theological-Political Treatise, chapter IV. Ibid., §39, p. 220: “Er 
ziehet aber aus dieser meynung, daß Gott die natur selbst sey, und daß alles aus ihm und zu ihm 
geschaffen, unter andern folgendes heraus: «Weil ohne Gott nichts weder seyn noch begriffen 
werden kan, so ists gewiß, daß alles, was in der natur ist, einen begriff von Gott nach der art eines 
jeden wesens und seiner vollkommenheit mit sich bringe, und ausdrücke, und daß wir dahero 
eine desto grössere und vollkommenere erkänntniß Gottes erlangen, je mehr wir die natürlichen 
dinge erkennen» q) [Tractat. Theologico-Polit. C.IV., p. 47].” 
56 Ibid, §40, p. 220: “Dabey will er beweisen, daß er nicht auf dieser äusserlichen erkänntniß Gottes 
eben stehen blieben, sondern redet wider die fleischlichen menschen, “die deswegen die 
erkänntniß und liebe Gottes vor nichtig hielten, weil sie an diesem höchsten gut nichts finden, daß 
sie greiffen oder essen, oder damit sie sonst ihr fleisch belustigen könten. Hingegen schreibet er, 
dieses dictire die idea oder der begriff von Gott in der seelen, daß Gott unser höchstes gut sey/ 
oder daß die erkänntniß und liebe Gottes der letzte zweck sey/ dahin alle unsere verrichtungen 
zielen sollen. Und wer da wise, daß er nichts edlers als seinen verstand habe, der werde dieses 
vor mehr als zu solid halten. r) [Tractat. Theologico-Polit. C.IV., p. 46].“ 
57 Ibid, §43, p. 221 (quotation of Tract. Theol. Polit. C.I., p. 7). 
58 “Letter XXI [LXXIII] to H. Oldenburg”, in The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, vol. II, 299. Arnold 
quotes this letter too (§43, p. 221): “Ohne den ewigen Sohn Gottes, das ist, ohne die ewige 
weisheit Gottes, die sich in allen dingen, und sonderlich in dem menschlichen gemüth, am 
allermeisten aber in Christo Jesu offenbahret hat, kan niemand zum stande der seligkeit kommen, 






When referring expressly to the texts of the Dutch thinker, where he talks 
about the Wisdom of God, Arnold suggests a sophiological understanding of 
Spinoza’s doctrine about the unity between God and nature. In the same year of 
the appearance of the second volume of the Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-
historie (1700), he published the sophiological treatise Das Geheimniss de 
Göttlichen Sophia oder Weißheit/ Beschrieben und Besungen von Gottfried Arnold 
(Leipzig, 1700). The Biography of the German radical Pietist goes in this time a 
sophiological period through: he reflects about Sophia and lives according to the 
ascetic principles of Sophia59. This is the reason why Gottfried Arnold recognizes 
in Spinoza’s metaphysical reflections rather a kind of sophiology than an 
“acosmism” or Pantheism.  
Of course, compared to the sophiological doctrine of Jacob Böhme or to 
Arnold’s own very complex sophiological reflections, Spinoza offers only a few 
considerations about the Wisdom of God. For example, he does not receive the 
unusual doctrine of Böhme60 about Sophia as the fourth hypostasis of the Holy 
Trinity. For him, as for the Fathers of the Church in antiquity, the Wisdom of God 
is actually the Son of God. But the logic is the same: the ideas of the things are 
collected in the Wisdom of God and thereby all the beings exist and move in God. 
Gottfried Arnold does not develop enough his considerations about 
Spinoza’s metaphysics as sophiology, but suggests that this is the key of its 
understanding. The completions about this topic at the end of the second volume 
of Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-historie (ed. 1741)61, which are due to 
Johann Friedrich Cotta (1701-1779), do nothing other than to contradict 
Spinoza’s original interpretation by Gottfried Arnold in the name of his usual 







Arnold, Gottfried. Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-historie vom Anfang des Neuen 
Testaments biß auf das Jahr Christi 1688. [1699-1700], bey dieser neuen Auflage  
an vielen Orten verbessert, und in bequemere Ordnung bgebracht, wie auch mit 
verschiedenen nützlichen Anmerckungen und einem weitläuffigem Anhang 
vermehert. Bd. II. Schaffhausen, 1741. 
                                                             
59 See Ocoleanu, Sophia Parthenos, 121-27; 138-45. 
60 See Jacob Böhme, De triplici vita hominis, oder vom Dreyfachen leben des Menschen, ed. Amsterdam, 
1682, V, 9-81, pp. 73-86. 
61 Arnold, Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-historie, Num. XXIII. Von Benedicto Spinosa. Zum II. 
Th. XVII. Buch, XVI. Cap. § 36-45, pp. 1152-1154. 
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